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Dynamics of a social population is analyzed taking into account some physical constraints on
individual behavior and decision making abilities. The model, based on Evolutionary Game Theory,
predicts that a population has to pass through a series of different games, e.g as a consequence
of environmental fluctuations, in order to develop social cooperation and communication skills.
It differs from the general assumption that evolution of cooperation, the so called Cooperation
Paradox, can be explained by a single set of rules for intra-population competitions. The developed
methods, potentially, have a practical value for some learning optimization problems in multiagent,
e.g. corporate, environment.
Behavior of social animals, especially human beings,
is characterized by controversial equilibrium between
selfishness[1] and altruism, acting alone or joining an al-
liance, logical thinking and irrationality[2]. Ambiguity of
the observations complicates the separation of the field
data into causes and consequences of the evolution of so-
cial behavior. Moreover, the relevant original phenomena
can be suppressed in the modern populations. There-
fore, it is beneficial to study the emergence of sociability
presenting evolution as a game imposed on the individ-
ual members of a population and comparing the different
possible evolutionary mechanisms using the Evolutionary
Game Theory[3].
The main question of the theory of social evolution is,
probably, how the ”selfish” competitions for the better
individual share of the genome pool of the subsequent
generation led to the development of willingness to con-
tribute to the others on the personal expense? Any act
committed in favor of the others may contradict to the
Darwinian survival of the fittest. Indeed, Cooperation
Paradox emerges trying to define the main properties of
the game corresponding to the development of social co-
operation: the games favoring single selfish winners, like
Prisoners Dilemma or Hawk-Dove Games, correspond to
our notion of the reality, although predict lower level of
cooperation than it is believed to be present in nature.
There are three general possibilities to explain observa-
tions of behavior that seem to be irrational from the Dar-
winian evolution point of view. First, a help to the others
can be justified by some unforeseen personal interest, e.g.
because of group[4, 5, 6] or kin (self-sacrifice in favor of
the family)[7, 8] selections, as well as due to future award
or punishment ensured by reciprocity[9, 10, 11] or altru-
istic punishment[12]. Second, one can assume that the
optimum of individual behavior has not been evolved yet
or its fluctuations are significant. Third, physical con-
straints on the possible evolutionary developments can
cause cooperation-like behavior, e.g. enforcement of fair
signalling by physical inability to deceive[13]. The group
selection is considered to be a weak phenomenon[4]. It
makes the physical constraints approach to be, proba-
bly, the only one capable of providing an explanation to
cooperation between unrelated individuals with no com-
mon past or future, in a form of a general property of our
world.
In this Letter a model of an evolving social popula-
tion is constructed, based on, probably, the oldest so-
cial dilemma: acting alone or joining an alliance. The
requirements for specific assumptions on the individ-
ual decision making mechanisms and structure of intra-
population interactions network[14] are overcomed using
symmetry considerations and some physical constraints,
e.g. inability to divide resources like small amount of food
or mating opportunities in mammals, together with lim-
itations on the rational group decision making, discussed
in social science and psychology[15, 16, 17]. The current
state of a population is demonstrated to depend on the
whole history of the evolutionary selection rules, rather
than the most recent ones, providing an explanation for
the observed significant differences in social abilities of
otherwise similar groups. In addition a population based
on mutual reciprocal exploitation, characterized by the
correlated mutual responses of cooperate/exploit type, is
predicted to be the most likely evolutionary development.
The correlated responses of this type are impossible with-
out development of information exchange between indi-
vidual members of the population. The population dy-
namics and stability conditions are analyzed for a broad
range of possible evolutionary games, including Prisoners
Dilemma and Chicken (Snow-Drift, Hawk-Dove) Game.
The results seem to correspond to the available qualita-
tive experimental data[18].
Quantitative description of the evolution of a popu-
lation requires parametrization of the possible individ-
ual responses, inter-population interactions and individ-
ual decision making abilities. Fortunately, in biology the
binary responses are common, for instance fight or re-
treat, cooperate or defect, etc. Therefore, we consider a
population composed of individuals capable of generat-
ing only selfish 1 and cooperative 2 responses. Individu-
als compete with each other for some resources alone or
creating the alliances. The price and the benefits of the
2competition are taken into account through the payoffs
for choosing specific response against the response of the
opponent (see Fig. 1A). The payoffs can vary with time
favoring or suppressing the cooperation, e.g. due to the
changes in value of the resources caused by environment
fluctuations[19].
In the presented model, each individual possesses three
parameters to evolve: sociability ǫ together with α and
β, describing individual behavior in the course of a com-
petition. The inter-population competitions are approx-
imated by the pairwise interactions, with only one of the
opponents acting either individually or as a member of
an alliance, with individual probabilities 1− ǫ and ǫ cor-
respondingly (see Fig. 1B). It corresponds to the biolog-
ical species competing for almost indivisible prizes, like
small amounts of food or mating opportunities of mam-
mals. In this case, each prize can be consumed only by
the individual winner of individual/individual or individ-
ual/alliance contests. The parameter ǫ can be considered
as a measure of the presence of the alliances: in a homo-
geneous population with ǫ = 0 all the competitions are
of individual/individual type, otherwise if ǫ = 1 only in-
dividual/alliance contests occur.
An individual acting alone is characterized by the prob-
abilities α and β to be in cooperative response 2 against
the opponent in selfish 1 and cooperative 2 modes cor-
respondingly (see Fig. 1C), receiving payoff according
to the table of payoffs (see Fig. 1A). We assume that
the members of a population have equal opportunities
to consume specific amount of prizes during all possible
interactions, rather than per single pairwise interaction.
Therefore the table of payoffs describes the average to-
tal possible payoffs of an individual for its competitions
in non-member of an alliance mode, although it requires
competitions with prizes of different values to the com-
petitors. The parameters α and β are similar to the cor-
relations with previous choice of the opponent[20, 21, 22].
However, α and β include individual decision making
abilities and any (rather than only memory based) de-
tection of the intentions of the others. It corresponds to
the biological species, especially human beings, recogniz-
ing the intentions of the others with no common past[23].
An individual acting as a member of an alliance gen-
erates random response according to the average statis-
tics of its responses, and gets no payoff for the interac-
tion. The random behavior is an extreme approximation
of the possible constraints on the decision making abil-
ities of an individual in a group[15, 16, 17]. It can be
interpreted as some type of conformal behavior[24], tak-
ing into account that a random response, biased by the
average behavior, is indistinguishable from the ”average
behavior” definition of social norms[25]. The no payoff
condition takes into account the reduction of the cost of
the defeat and the benefit of the success for the members
of an alliance, competing together for almost indivisible
prizes. Surprisingly, these approximations make possible
the optimization of the benefit of the whole population
by the selfish competition between its members.
Evolution of a population consists of two pro-
cesses: density redistribution between existing pheno-
types (αi, βi, ǫi) and emergence of new mutations with
initial minimal ”seed” densities. The first process is de-
scribed by Replicator Dynamics[26] equations:
d
dt
ρi = ρi
Fi − F¯
|F¯ |
, F¯ =
N∑
i=1
ρiFi, (1)
where ρi is the density (sometimes called frequency) of
the individual i in the population. The individual fitness
Fi is the the averaged payoff Pi of individual i over all
possible interactions. To define emergence of new muta-
tions, the (α, β, ǫ) space state density is assumed to be
homogeneous and new mutations are assumed to be small
modifications of the existing phenotypes[20, 21, 22].
The individual fitness Fi (see eq. (1)) depends on the
all phenotypes (αj , βj , ǫj) present in the population. Ac-
cording to the definitions of α and β, the average payoff
for an individual i for the interaction with an opponent
possessing probability γ to be in the selfish state 1 is (see
Fig. 1A and 1C):
Pi(γ) = γαic− γ(1− αi) + (1 − βi)(1 − γ)b, (2)
where b and c are the payoffs (see Fig. 1A). Let us define
γij to be the average γ of individual (αi, βi) interacting
with individual (αj , βj). In a population composed of
identical individuals, self-consistent symmetry requires
γii = (1 − α)γii + (1 − β)(1 − γii), see Fig. 1C and 1D.
Consequently:
γii = (1− β)/(1 + α− β). (3)
In the same fashion, γij = (1−αi)γji +(1− βi)(1− γji).
Taking into account the mirror equation for γji one gets:
γij = ((1−βi)−(1−βj)(αi−βi))/(1−(αi−βi)(αj−βj)).
(4)
The average γi, corresponding to the probability to find
an individual i in the state 1, required to describe its
response as a member of an alliance, is derived from self-
consistent system of equations:
3γi =
N∑
j=1
[(1− ǫj)ρj((1− αi)γji + (1 − βi)(1 − γji)) + ǫjρj((1− αi)γj + (1− βi)(1− γj)] , (5)
where the averaging is performed over all interactions
with all other individuals j, in their individual 1 − ǫj
and member of an alliance ǫj modes. The fitness Fi is
obtained by averaging Pi over all possible interactions,
similar to eq. (5):
Fi =
N∑
j=1
[(1 − ǫj)ρjPi(γji) + ǫjρjPi(γj)]. (6)
Eqs. (1) and (6) define the evolutionary dynamics of the
proposed model.
Surprisingly, the development of sociability ǫ is much
slower process rather than the evolutionary dynamics of
the individual behavior parameters α and β. For all pos-
sible games payoffs b and c, there is no relative evolu-
tionary advantage (any difference in fitness (6)) between
two competing equipopulated subgroups, different only
by the value of sociability: (α, β, ǫ) and (α, β, ǫ + ∆ǫ)
(see supplementary materials). Consequently, there is no
evolutionary preference for a change of the sociability of
a confined population, unless its α and β vary with time
(see Fig. 2A). If b and c are constant, the total change
∆ǫtotal ∝ ∆ǫmut
√
∆α2total +∆β
2
total (∆ǫmut is a single
mutation step), remaining to be small, because the pos-
sible ∆αtotal and ∆βtotal are limited by ≈ 1, until the
convergence to one of the stable points. Therefore, the
significant changes in ǫ can be caused only by alternating
with time interaction payoffs b and c. One example of the
development of ǫ with time is shown in Fig. 2B, although
the general problem of optimal b(t) and c(t) remains to
be an open question.
The evolutionary stable values of α and β can be
treated as the functions of the game payoffs b and c, to-
gether with sociability ǫ, due to the slow dynamics of the
latter (see Fig. 3). Only developed sociability ǫ = 1 en-
sures the stability of a population based on mutual recip-
rocal exploitation ((α = 1, β = 0), corresponding to the
pairwise interactions of selfish vs. cooperative type 12)
for all range of the payoffs corresponding to the Chicken
(Snow-Drift, Hawk-Dove) game (see Fig. 3A). Decrease
of the value of ǫ reduces the number of games that can
keep population out of homogeneous states (see Fig. 3).
Evolution of a population with correlated mutual indi-
vidual responses (α 6= β, see Fig. 1D) is possible only
with development of information exchange between the
individuals[27]. Consequently, it can be associated with
development of communication skills, like language or
writing.
Evolution of biological species based entirely on Pris-
oners Dilemma, according to the model, results in a self-
ish population ((α = 0, 0 ≤ β < 1), pairwise interactions
11), see Figs. 3A and 3D. The individuals of this popu-
lation, however, can possess an ability to recognize coop-
eration (state 2) and cooperate in response (β > 0, see
Figs. 3D, 3A and 1D). The finite level of (22) mutual re-
sponses, β(1−γ) 6= 0, must be observed in the population
with γ < 1 and β > 0, playing Prisoners Dilemma for a
period of time that is too short to change the individual
parameters. It corresponds qualitatively to the experi-
ments where different population demonstrate different
level of cooperation[28] and degradation of cooperation
with time is observed[18].
The model predicts the optimal games for the fastest
transition from a selfish or cooperative populations to an
exploitative one (see Fig. 4), in case of developed so-
ciability ǫ = 1. The time required to develop specific
population depends on the properties of the population
itself and the history of the game parameters b(t) and
c(t). It is a consequence of the topological constraints on
the dynamics in (α, β, ǫ) space, defining the mutations
that can take over the population. For instance, much
longer time required to develop synchronous population
((α = 0, β = 1),pairwise interactions 11, 22), rather than
exploitative one ((α = 1,β = 0, pairwise interactions
12), due to the small amount of the allowed mutations
near the axis α = 0 and β = 1 in this case (see Fig. 3).
The synchronization of the responses, like in synchronous
population, is common between the cells in the multicel-
lular organisms. Therefore this prediction is intriguing,
due to disproportional large time taken for development
of multicellularity, relative to the other major evolution-
ary transitions[29]. The existence of the optimal game
corresponds to our intuition that neither too harsh nor
too soft conditions are optimal for a learning process.
To conclude, the Cooperation Paradox was addressed
by taking into account the advantages and disadvantages
of being a member of an alliance, especially the possible
constraints on the individual decision making abilities. It
was demonstrated that a population has to pass through
a series of different conditions, favoring and suppress-
ing selfishness, in order to develop a robust sociability
based on contribution to the others at the personal ex-
pense. In case of developed sociability, an exploitative
population, characterized by the correlated mutual re-
sponses of cooperate/exploit (rather than homogeneous
cooperation or selfishness) type, was shown to be sta-
ble for a whole range of the Chicken (Hawk-Dove, Snow-
Drift) Game. The presented method, being free from the
4specific assumptions on the individual decision making
mechanisms, provides a general framework for analysis of
different hypothesis of evolution of social behavior. The
future developments of the model can include modifica-
tion of the inter-population interactions rules and inves-
tigation of the possibility of the individuals affect the
abilities of the others, e.g. evolution of the ability to
deceive.
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5FIG. 1: The evolution of a population is defined by the
interactions on the individual level. (A), Table of pay-
offs Wij for the pairwise interactions. The table is reduced
to two parameters form by subtraction of W22 and subse-
quent normalization by |W11 −W22|. Two, rather than four,
parameters significantly simplify the presentation. This nor-
malization does not affect the stable points of the population
dynamics (see eqs. (1) and (2)). (B), The asymmetric prob-
ability to generate random response during an interaction ǫ,
interpreted as acting alone or out of an alliance. (C), Correla-
tions α and β describe the individual (dashed line) ability to
recognize the intentions of the opponent (solid line) and make
an appropriate decision. The parameter γ corresponds to the
probability of finding an individual in the selfish response 1.
(D), The γ of a homogeneous population composed of in-
dividuals (α, β, ǫ). The points (0, 1) and (1, 0) describe the
correlated populations with set of mutual responses (11, 22)
and (12) correspondingly. The condition α = β corresponds
to the populations composed of individuals randomly choos-
ing selfish or cooperative responses, disregard of the state of
the opponent.
6FIG. 2: Dynamics of a confined population in (α, β, ǫ)
space is governed by the time dependent game pay-
offs b(t) and c(t). (A), A population is driven by the game
payoffs, making specific mutations to do better than the oth-
ers. The population remains confined, while new mutations
appear less frequent rather than the old take over the popula-
tions according to eq. (1). Surprisingly, a confined population
in (α, β, ǫ) space experiences first order drag, defined by the
game weights b and c, only in (α, β) plane. The development
of the social behavior ǫ is the second order process, requiring
∆α,∆β 6= 0. (B), The development of ǫ requires continuous
motion away of the points where both α and β are constant.
Here is an example of ǫ(t) with ∆ǫmut = 0.05, one muta-
tion step in time = 10, b = 1 + 2cos(2π10−3Nsteps), c =
2sin(2π10−3Nsteps) and α, β confined to the circle with the
center at (0.11, 0.15) and the radius 0.05. The (∂α/∂t, ∂β/∂t)
was derived numerically and used to estimate ∂ǫ/∂t. The
change of the game payoffs can be a consequence of both in-
dividual evolution or environment changes. Evolution of life
on Earth, oscillating from harsh to more soft conditions, jus-
tifies the requirement to consider time dependent b(t) and
c(t).
7FIG. 3: The stable points in (α, β, ǫ) space. (A), In
the case ǫ = 1 for all individuals in the population, all of
them experience the rest of society as an individual in the
alliance mode, described by the probability γii (see eq. (3))
to express response 1. Mutant j can invade the population
of i only in case Pj(γii) > Pi(γii). Using eq. (2) one can
write ∆β(1− γii)b < ∆αγii(c+ 1), where ∆α = αj − αi and
∆β = βj − βi. Near the axis α = 0 and β = 1, for specific
b and c, the amount of the evolutionary favorable mutations
is converging to 0, see γii in Fig 1D, making the dynamics
to be very slow. Numerical simulation demonstrate the same
behavior for all range of 0 < ǫ < 1. It makes the exploita-
tive population (α = 1, β = 0) to be the only one that can
be reached in a reproducible way. The exploitative popula-
tion is more beneficial on average to its members rather than
cooperative ((0 < α ≤ 1, β = 1),22) one, if (b + c)/2 > 0.
Otherwise, if (b+ c)/2 < 0, the exploitative population is still
evolutionary stable, although the cooperative society is more
beneficial. (B), In the case ǫ = 0, the system either converges
to a specific points on the axis β = 0 and α = 1, or, otherwise,
remains at random point on one of the edges α = 0 or β = 1.
The presented data was derived using the condition for the
stable points on the boundaries and direct simulation of pop-
ulations composed of up to 10 different phenotypes (α, β, ǫ).
(C), The same for the case ǫ = 0.9. (D), Comparison with
the model games demonstrate that the population playing
the Chicken Game (sometimes called as Hawk-Dove or Snow-
Drift, W12 > W22 > W11 > W21), rather than Prisoner’s
Dilemma (W12 > W22 > W21 > W11), is able to stabilize the
exploitative population (1, 0).
8FIG. 4: Development of mutual correlation in the pop-
ulation with ǫ = 1 as a function of the game payoffs
b and c. The time required for the transition from a popu-
lation with random mutual responses to the correlated one,
was analyzed by numerical simulation. Such transition can
occur during the development of a common language. Fast
mutation spread over the entire population was assumed, cor-
responding to the cultural evolution. In the case ǫ = 1, fol-
lowing condition ∆β(1− γii)b < ∆αγii(c+ 1) (see Fig. 3A),
the (c + 1)/b is the only relevant parameter and two tran-
sition, (0, 0) → (1, 0) and (1, 1) → (1, 0), are identical un-
der (c + 1)/b → b/(c + 1) transformation. The group selec-
tion can be introduced by requirement for growing average
fitness of the population, predicting the optimal games at
(c = 1.5 ± 0.01, b = 0.9 ± 0.03) and b → ∞, for the transi-
tions (0, 0) → (1, 0) and (1, 1) → (1, 0) correspondingly. The
presented results are derived using single step diffusion sim-
ulation. The minima’s search functions of GSL were used to
find optimal values of b, c and (c+ 1)/b.
